THE CHALLENGE OF RELIGIOUS MODERATION AMIDST THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AMONG INSTANT *USTADZ* IN INDONESIA

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Abstract: The issues of arrogance, religious extremism, and misunderstanding of Islamic teachings are serious problems that have the potential to disrupt socio-religious stability. This article explicitly explores the recent proliferation of instant preachers (*ustadz*) who lack a profound comprehension of religion, a moderate *sanad*, and an intellectualist interpretation of religion. Ultimately, these groups exhibit signs of religious arrogance, encompassing the practice of *takfīr*, the assertion of supremacy, and a proclivity for advocating discrimination over violence. This article uses a qualitative method of descriptive critical analysis and literature study. The main data refer to the findings of virtual observations related to the rampant phenomenon of arrogant instant preachers, as well as data from surveys by specialized institutions that study extreme religious movements on social media, and selected interviews with various parties. The findings of this article indicate that individuals who acquire a comprehensive understanding of religion without the guidance of a qualified and tempered instructor are susceptible to developing an exaggerated sense of self-importance, which can manifest in religious extremism. With its *takfirī* characteristics and often legalizing violence, this is a serious problem, especially for preachers in Indonesia. This article can be academically useful in the field of religious pattern studies in Indonesia. Practically, it is expected to get a response from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the National Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs (BPNT), Indonesian Ulema Council's Countering Extremism

and Terrorism Agency (BPET-MUI), and moderate religious organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah to pay more attention to the emergence of new preachers who have sprung up on social media with backgrounds and religious understanding that are far from the competency standards of mastery of religious knowledge.

Abstrak: Masalah kesombongan, ekstremisme agama, dan kesalahpahaman terhadap ajaran Islam merupakan persoalan serius yang dapat mengganggu stabilitas sosial-keagamaan. Artikel ini secara eksplisit mengkaji fenomena mendadak munculnya para dai instan (ustadz) yang tidak memiliki pemahaman mendalam terhadap agama, tidak memiliki sanad keilmuan yang moderat, dan memahami agama secara intelektualistik semata. Pada akhirnya, mereka menjadi arogan dalam beragama, yang ditandai dengan mudah mengkafirkan (*takfīrī*), merasa paling benar, serta cenderung menyebarkan ajaran diskriminatif hingga kekerasan. Penulisan artikel ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan analisis kritis deskriptif dan studi kepustakaan. Data utama merujuk pada temuan observasi virtual terkait maraknya fenomena dai instan yang arogan, kemudian data dari survei lembaga-lembaga khusus yang mengkaji gerakan keagamaan ekstrem di media sosial, serta wawancara terpilih dengan berbagai pihak. Hasil temuan dalam artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa seseorang yang mempelajari agama secara instan tanpa guru yang tepat dan moderat memiliki potensi besar untuk menjadi pribadi yang arogan dan menyebabkan ekstremisme keagamaan. Dengan ciri-ciri *takfīrī* serta kerap melegalkan kekerasan, hal ini menjadi persoalan serius, khususnya bagi para pendakwah di Indonesia. Artikel ini secara akademik dapat berguna dalam kajian pola keberagamaan di Indonesia. Secara praktis, diharapkan dapat memperoleh respons dari Kementerian Agama, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), Badan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme dan Terorisme Majelis Ulama Indonesia (BPET-MUI), serta organisasi keagamaan moderat seperti NU dan Muhammadiyah untuk lebih memperhatikan kemunculan dai-dai baru yang bermunculan di media sosial dengan latar belakang dan pemahaman keagamaan yang jauh dari standar kompetensi penguasaan ilmu agama.

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Introduction

One form of lifestyle in the modern era is the desire of some people to master the vast knowledge of religion instantly. This personal problem brings social problems that are not small, namely, the emergence of changes in religious patterns that tend to be shallow and arrogant. Not only due to short religious learning, but the understanding of the text, values, and substance of Islamic teachings that are textualist is characterized by a light attitude to label apostates, polytheists, and heretics.[1] A necessity to decorate the public space is the emergence of people who are considered to understand religion, but in reality, they are not fluent in reading the Qur'an, even unable to understand it correctly. Such a phenomenon is a social problem that can derail society in the puddle of supremacy, especially sacred issues like religion.[2] Some *da'i* figures, including those with non-Muslim backgrounds with their rhetorical abilities in front of the public, are suddenly considered religious figures, which is a clear example in this context.

There are other examples showing the figure of the *ustadz* with his religious identity on the outside, but his scientific *sanad* is questionable. Even the most extreme is that there are preachers who are fond of swearing when proselytizing and mocking those who disagree. This phenomenon is also widespread among artists, ranging from movie players to comedians who are suddenly religious and even pretend to be preachers.[3] Although the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia echoes the narrative of religious moderation to counter radical extremism on social media, there is

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[1] Abdullah Haq Haidari (Al) et.al., "Radicalism and Religious Texts Understanding," *Kalam* 14, no. 02 (2020): 77–94, http://dx.doi.org/10.24042/klm.v14i2.7454.

[2] Ali Mursyid et. al. Azisi, "Textualist Islam Vis-à-Vis Dynamic Islam: A Study of the Urgency of the Dominance of Inclusive Narratives in the Digital Space," *Analisis: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 23, no. 1 (2023): 89–112, https://doi.org/10.24042/ajsk.v23i1.17886.

[3] A Rustan et al., "The Phenomenon of the Celebrity Preachers and the Awakening of the Religious Spirit of Millennial Generation in Indonesia," in *Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Conference on Islamic Studies, AICIS 2019, 1-4 October 2019, Jakarta, Indonesia* (Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Conference on Islamic Studies, AICIS 2019, 1-4 October 2019, Jakarta, Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia: EAI, 2020), 1-8, https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.1-10-2019.2291699.

no recent data released regarding the anticipation of dispelling radical preachers. However, in a report by the Directorate of Informatics Application Control (*Ditjen Aptika-Kominfo*) on March 19, 2019, confirmed that it had blocked accounts that tended to preach exclusive-radical content, namely as much as 8,131 content on Facebook and Instagram, 678 content on YouTube and Google, 1,384 content on Twitter, 494 content on websites, 614 content on Telegram, and 502 content on File Sharing.[4] Then, as of April 3, 2021, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology also blocked 20,543 contents that indicated radicals on social media.[5]

Another data regarding instant preachers who lead to radicalization movements on social media is the Muslim Cyber Army Indonesia (MCAI). This is evident from the statement of one of the MCAI members named Ramdhani that their movement has a schedule to conduct discourse wars on social media to campaign for radical religious patterns in the guise of modern preachers.[6] Then the latest data from *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* (BNPT) or the National Counterterrorism Agency in collaboration with *Kementrian Komunikasi dan Digital* (Komdigi) or the Ministry of Communication and Digital released throughout 2024 has blocked 180,954 preaching content by instant preachers containing intolerance, radicalism, extremism and terrorism in cyberspace. Most of the content produced is propaganda produced by HTI, JAD, and ISIS preaching activists who are still actively promoting violence on digital platforms.[7] In fact, one of the main requirements in learning religion in the book *Ta'līm al-Muta'allim* is, for a long time, accompanied by the guidance of the right teacher.[8] A fairly strategic

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[4] Kominfo, "Kominfo Blokir 11.803 Konten Radikalisme Dan Terorisme," 2019, https://kominfo.kepriprov.go.id/arsip/detailArsip/2827.

[5] Kominfo, "Kominfo Blokir 20.453 Konten Terorisme Radikalisme Di Media Sosial," 2021, https://aptika.kominfo.go.id/2021/04/kominfo-blokir-20-453-konten-terorisme-radikalisme-di-media-sosial/.

[6] Detik News, "Anggota Muslim Cyber Army Ungkap Jadwal Perang Mereka Di Medsos," 2018, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3910139/anggota-muslim-cyber-army-ungkap-jadwal-perang-mereka-di-medsos.

[7] BNPT, "BNPT: 180 Ribu Konten Bermuatan Terorisme Diblokir Sepanjang 2024," 2024, https://www.bnpt.go.id/bnpt-180-ribu-konten-bermuatan-terorisme-diblokir-sepanjang-2024.

[8] Al-Zarnuji, *Ta'līm al-Muta'allim*, I (Surabaya: Maktabah Syaikh Salam bin Nabhani, n.d.), pp. 2-3.

field of da'wah among instant preachers today is social media for instant preachers. The main target is young people who are thirsty for religion.

In response to this phenomenon, this article tries to seriously examine the phenomenon of instant *ustadz* with several problems attached to it. As a basic premise, it is assumed that the pattern of learning religion practically (instantly) and without teacher results in a haphazard, textual interpretation model and an arrogant attitude.[9] The arrogance in question is feeling more righteous and superior, easily labeling infidels and heretics. From the arrogant nature, it will have an impact on religious extremism patterns.

The pattern of extremism in academic studies may have been examined with a multi-perspectival approach. It is interesting if it is developed and enriches academic literature in terms of extreme religious patterns in the context of preachers or *ustadz* (*da'i*) in Indonesia. Previous research that examines instant preachers who tend to be radical and conservative has been conducted by Mohammed Errihani, who focuses on examining various types of sermons delivered in Moroccan mosques, one of which leads to extremist movements.[10] Errihani views that the government's intervention in managing Friday sermons in mosques by controlling preachers and more moderate material is considered successful in overcoming the extremist problem so far.[11] Furthermore, Angela Gendron examines the Call to *Jihād*: Charismatic Preachers and the Internet. The content of one of the chapters of the book Violent Extremism Online discusses the portrait of preachers or disseminators of Islamic teachings in online media who call for *jihād* by fighting those who disagree. The invitation that is actually preached is one way of using violence.[12]

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[9] Moch. Fakhruroji, "Public Islam and Preacher-Disruptors in Indonesia: A Case Study," in *The 'Crossed-Out God'in the Asia-Pacific: Religious Efficacy of Public Spheres* (Springer Nature Singapore, 2023), pp. 11–127.

[10] Ruth Kinna & Uri Gordon, *Routledge Handbook of Radical Politics* (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 24-25.

[11] Mohammed Errihani, "Managing Religious Discourse in the Mosque: The End of Extremist Rhetoric during the Friday Sermon," *The Journal of North African Studies* 16, no. 3 (September 2011): 381–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2010.515411.

[12] Angela Gendron, "The Call to *Jihād*: Charismatic Preachers and the Internet," in *Violent Extremism Online* (London: Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, 2016), pp. 1–20.

Then Muhammad Farid also examined the problem of intolerance and radicalism movements that are troubling in Indonesia. This is a serious problem that has been widely studied in Indonesia, and Farid views that each act of radicalism violence has its own motivations and must be understood casually.[13] Furthermore, Alexander R. Arifianto, in his research that examines the Contradiction between Pluralist Theology and Religious Intolerance in Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesia, is extraordinary. He found a contradictory point to NU's teachings inherited from senior scholars about pluralist attitudes. On the other hand, especially at the grassroots, they still often discriminate against minorities such as Ahmadiyah and Shi'ah. Arifianto uses social movement theory in tracking intolerant factors that are still a problem for NU at the grassroots.[14] Furthermore, Cameron Sumpter explicitly examines efforts to counter extremist movements in Indonesia practically and the role of civil society so that violence in the name of religion no longer occurs.[15]

From some of the previous studies above, the main difference is that this article is more focused on examining the religious attitudes of instant *ustadz*, who are textual in interpreting verses and tend to be radical and extreme in understanding religion (haphazard). Therefore, this article will examine the phenomenon of instant *ustadz* that is spreading as a socio-religious problem in Indonesia. The rude and arrogant character of instant *ustadz* is a big problem, which in this article is called religious extremism. This social anomaly is studied with two objectives at once. First, to explore the changes in the pattern of *da'wa* in the country, which was originally *rahmatan lil 'ālamīn*, became extreme. Second, to elaborate that religious extremism has now become a popular lifestyle among instant preachers and their followers.

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[13] Muhammad Farid, "Religious Intolerance and the Problematic of Religious Radicalism in Indonesia," *International Seminary*, 2018, pp. 45-52.

[14] Alexander R Arifianto, "Practicing What It Preaches? Understanding the Contradictions between Pluralist Theology and Religious Intolerance within Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 55, no. 2 (December 15, 2017): 241–64, https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2017.552.241-264.

[15] Cameron Sumpter, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Priorities, Practice and the Role of Civil Society.," *Journal for Deradicalization*, no.11 2017: 112-147.

Research Method

This study employs a qualitative-descriptive approach to examine the phenomenon of instant preachers whose emergence has contributed to the rise of arrogant, misguided, and extreme interpretations of Islamic teachings in the digital era. The qualitative method is particularly suited for capturing and analyzing socio-religious dynamics, especially those developing through social media platforms where religious authority is increasingly contested.

The research relies on a literature-based analysis (library research), utilizing a wide range of scholarly sources that are relevant, peer-reviewed, and methodologically sound. These sources provide the conceptual foundation for understanding how religious extremism can emerge from non-institutionalized and unsanctioned forms of religious learning. The notion of "arrogant religiosity" is developed by interpreting patterns of religious discourse that lack moderation, *sanad* (chain of scholarly transmission), and methodological rigor in interpreting the Qur'an and Sunnah. By using relevant, accredited, and accountable literature study steps, this article develops the concept of extreme religion into a religious pattern that is called arrogant and leads to extreme when understanding religion haphazardly.[16]

In addition to textual analysis, the study incorporates primary data through semi-structured interviews conducted with several Islamic da'wah activists affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama, as well as with members of the public. These interviews aim to capture community perceptions and lived experiences concerning the growing influence of radical and populist preachers on social media.

The research was conducted over a one-month period, encompassing the development of the research design, data collection, and synthesis. The process included careful triangulation of data sources, combining textual findings with field-based insights to ensure analytical depth and credibility. Thematic analysis was applied to identify key patterns related to the spread of religious extremism and the rhetoric of unqualified preachers.

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[16] Matthew B. Miles and Matthew B. Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis (a Source Book of New Methods)* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 98.

Data processing in this paper is inseparable from the process of data collection, analysis, and conclusions from the study that is the main focus.[17] Hence, this this study positions religious extremism not merely as a theological deviation, but as a social pathology linked to the commodification of religious authority in the age of digital populism. The term "religious extremism" as used in this article refers specifically to attitudes and practices that emerge from instant, unsupervised religious learning that lacks scholarly legitimacy and is often marked by textual literalism, intolerance, and a superiority complex in matters of faith.

The Basic Concept of *"Wasaṭiyyah"* Religious Moderation

The phrases "Islam" and "*wasaṭiyyah*" are combined to form the notion of moderate Islam, commonly referred to as " *wasaṭiyyah* Islam." The Arabic word for "moderation," "*al- wasaṭiyyah*," has its etymological roots in the word " *wasaṭ*." According to al-Isfahānī, " *wasaṭan*" means "*sawā'un,"* which denotes a midway ground between two extremes. It can also represent justice, a balanced stance, or dominance.[18] Additionally, " *wasaṭan*" means refraining from unyielding viewpoints that could even depart from the fundamentals of religious truth.

Furthermore, the term *wasaṭiyyah* is often synonymized with *al-iqtiṣād*, with the derivation of the subject *al-muqtaṣid*. However, at the applicative level, *wasaṭiyyah* is more commonly used to represent a comprehensive paradigm of thought, especially in the context of religious attitudes in Islam. Meanwhile, in the Arabic lexicon, the concept of moderation is commonly termed *wasaṭiyyah,* and individuals who practice it are called *wasiṭ.[19]* The word "*wasiṭ*" itself has been adopted into the Indonesian language with three main meanings: 1) mediator or intermediary (e.g. in the context of trade, business, and the like), 2) facilitator or reconciler between disputing parties, and 3) referee. Linguistically, according to Arabic linguists, the term refers to "everything that is good according to its object".

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[17] Monique dan Inge Hutter dan Ajay Bailey Hennik, *Qualitative Research Methods* (London: Sage Publication, 2020), p 60.

[18] Abū Qāsim al-Husayn b. Muhammad b. al-Mufaḍḍal al-Rāghib al-Isfahānī, *Kitāb al-Dharī'a ilā Makārim al-Sharī'a*. Ed. Yazīd al-'Ajāmi. (Cairo, 1987), p. 58.

[19] Mohammad Hashim Kaali, *The Middle Path of Moderation in Islam: The Qur'anic Principle of Wasatiyyah* (New York: Oxford University, 2015), p. 126.

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An Arabic adage states that the best of all things is that which is in the middle. To illustrate, generosity is seen as the middle position between stinginess and extravagance, courage as the balance point between fear and recklessness, and other examples.

Linguistically, *wasaṭiyyah* or moderation is defined in terms of two main aspects: the reduction of violence and the avoidance of extremity. The term "moderate" refers to a reasonable individual,[20] middle of the road, and not excessive. In the English context, the word "moderate" often corresponds to the meaning of "average," "core," "standard," or "impartial."[21] In general, moderation can be understood as a constructive effort to maintain harmony at the level of views, values, and character, both in interpersonal interactions and in relations with government structures. In Islamic literature, the concept of moderate Islam is commonly associated with *ummatan wasaṭan* and identified with "*wasaṭiyyah Islam*".[22]

Furthermore, al-Qurthubi interpreted *al-wasaṭ* as "avoiding excess and deficiency (*mujāniban li al-ghuluw wa al-taqsīr*)".[23] Thus, the phrase *al-wasaṭ* and the concept of moderation, which both imply avoidance of extremity, being in the middle, or impartiality, have comparative connotations of meaning. In the Qur'an (QS al-Baqarah [2]: 143), Allah says, "And thus, We have made you (Muslims) a people of moderation (*wasaṭa*), that you may be witnesses to the people and that the Messenger (Muhammad) may be witness to you." Imām al-Ṭabarī (d. 923 CE) interpreted *ummatan wasaṭiyyah* in this verse as *khiyār*, which means chosen. Another implication contained in the phrase is the principle of impartiality or justice.[24]

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[20] Margaretha A Van Es, et. al. "Beyond Radical Versus Moderate? New Perspective on the Politics of Moderaton in Muslim Majority and Muslim Minority Settings." *Religion*, 51 no. 2 (2021): 161.

[21] A. Mas'ud, *Strategi Moderasi Antarumat Beragama* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2018). 79.

[22] Alwi Shihab, *Islam Inklusif* (Bandung: Mizan, 1999), p. 69.

[23] Suhaila Abdullah and Nur Izzaty Mohamad, "The Quranic Principle of Wasatiyyah as the Foundation of Malaysia Madani's Civilizational Framework," *International Journal of Word Civilization and Philosophical Studies* 2, no. 2 (2025): 90-94.

[24] Stephen Sulaiman Schwartz et al., *Dua Wajah Islam: Moderatisme vs Fundamentalisme Dalam Wacana Global* (Jakarta, Indonesia: Belantika, 2007), p. 30.

Al-wasaṭ is also conceptualized as the space between two extremes. From a theological perspective, Allah calls Muslims *ummatan wasaṭan*, which indicates their moderate religious practices and avoidance of excess. Imam Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209 CE) identified four lexical significances of the word "*wasaṭ*" in the Qur'an. First, it means *'adl* (justice), which represents the principle of impartiality. This meaning coheres with the concept of *al-bu'd 'an ṭarafay al-ifrāṭ wa al-tafrīṭ,* which articulates the condition of being "distanced from two extremes". The avoidance of extremes is seen as a prerequisite for the achievement of justice. Second, *wasaṭ* means "*khiyār*" (the best or chosen). Third, the word implies "*aktharu faḍlan*" (the most excellent or superior). Fourth, *wasaṭ* refers to the attitude of moderation in the implementation of rituals / worship and various religious activities.[25]

Furthermore, the development of this conception of moderation by academics into nine fundamental values. First, *Tawassuṭ* (taking the middle way) refers to the understanding and practice of religious teachings that avoid *ifrāṭ* (excessive attitude in religion) and *tafrīṭ* (attitude of reducing religious teachings). Second, *Tawāzun* (balance), which is a proportional understanding and practice of religion that covers all aspects of life, both worldly and *ukhrāwī*, with firmness in distinguishing between *inḥirāf* (deviation) and *ikhtilāf* (difference).[26] Third, *I'tidāl* (straight and firm), which means putting everything in proportion and exercising rights and fulfilling obligations fairly. Fourth, *Tasāmuh* (tolerance) is the recognition and respect for differences, both in religious aspects and various other aspects of life. Fifth, *Musāwāh* (egalitarian) is not discriminating against other parties based on differences in beliefs, traditions, or personal origins.[27]

The Phenomenon of Suddenly Becoming an *Ustadz*

The emergence of the phenomenon of suddenly becoming a cleric in Indonesia often causes internal debate among Muslims. It cannot be denied that the phenomenon has an impact on increasingly varied religious patterns. In addition to the pros and cons, it also has a negative impact on the pattern

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[25] Azisi, "Textualist Islam Vis-à-Vis Dynamic Islam: A Study of the Urgency of the Dominance of Inclusive Narratives in the Digital Space." p. 92.

[26] Tim Penyusun Bimas Islam, *Moderasi Beragama Perspektif Bimas Islam*., p. 85.

[27] Afrizal Nur, "Konsep Wasathiyyah Dalam Al-Quran;(Studi Komparatif Antara Tafsir Al-Tahrir Wa At-Tanwir Dan Aisar AtTafasir," *Journal An-Nur* 4, no. 2 (2015): 207.

of society in the country. Many of them claim to be preachers but have no religious background at all.[28] The most obvious example is Felix Xiau. He was born into a Catholic family and claimed to be an atheist. Finally, when he was studying at IPB, Felix vowed to convert to Islam and was introduced to the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) organization.[29] As he became known to the public, Felix gradually began to preach among millennials as his selling market. Another example is Sugik Nur (*Gus Nur*), who once said that he had never been a student but suddenly became an *ustadz* and had many followers despite his extreme preaching methods.[30]

Other controversial cases were also carried out by Tengku Zulkarnain, who once misinterpreted the word "*kāfir*" and once called the Dayak tribe *kāfir*. Then, from among rockers who turned into preachers, there are the names Herry Moekti, Gito Rollies, Irvan Sembiring and Yuke Semeru[31]. In addition, recently, what has disturbed the public space related to this is Heri Pras in his Instagram and TikTok @eripras, a content creator and digital preacher who often blames other groups and idols, misunderstands verses and tends to be arrogant.[32] Of course, for Islamic boarding schools and academics whose religious knowledge is credible, this is questionable. Because in the chapter on understanding religious messages,

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[28] Rahmi Nur Fitri and Indah Rama Jayanti, "Fenomena Seleb Hijrah: Tendensi Ekslusivisme dan Kemunculan Kelompok Sosial Baru," *MUHARRIK: Jurnal Dakwah dan Sosial* 3, no. 01 (January 29, 2020): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.37680/muharrik.v3i01.222.

[29] Hasbi Aswar, "Hizb Ut-Tahrir's Adaptation Strategies against the State Repression in Indonesia: A Social Movement Perspective," *SUVANNABHUMI* 14, no. 2 (July 2022): 233–49, https://doi.org/10.22801/SVN.2022.14.2.233.

[30] Merlyna Lim, "Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia," *Critical Asian Studies* 49, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 411–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2017.1341188.

[31] Saipul Hamdi, "Conflicting Religious Identities: Blaspheming Islam and the Future of Democracy in Indonesia," *Al-Albab* 6, no. 2 (December 1, 2017): 247, https://doi.org/10.24260/alalbab.v6i2.778.

[32] Muqsid Mahfudz, "Anomali Herri Pras, Mengaku Salafi Tapi Jauh Dari Fiqih Bermedia Sosialnya Salafi," Islami.co, accessed January 21, 2025, https://islami.co/anomali-herri-pras-mengaku-salafi-tapi-jauh-dari-fiqih-bermedia-sosialnya-salafi/.

it is not as easy as turning your hand, but you have to go through more learning phases until you can be called an *ustadz*.

In addition to what is mentioned above about the behavior of instant preachers who tend to be radical, their rhetoric is so dominating on social media. This is evident in the findings of research by Media and Religious Trend in Indonesia published in The Jakarta Post in November 2020. The findings make it clear that conservative-radical and extremism narratives dominate (67.2%), then moderate organizations (22.2%), liberal groups (6.1%), and Islamists (4.5%). In addition, from 2009 to 2019, conservative hashtags were frequently used.[33] This indicates a warning or red signal for the religious patterns of Indonesian society. The massive spread of radicalism involving various groups, including instant preachers, indicates that religious authority in cyberspace needs special attention because now anyone can become a preacher instantly and only by producing content as interesting as possible without involving the process of studying religious knowledge that is canalized and moderate.[34] This finding is further reinforced by the research of Gazali, Huda, and Kurniawan (2024), which reveals a significant potential for radicalism among students in Jambi: 47.6% of respondents expressed willingness to join violent jihadist groups, and 82.8% supported the establishment of an Islamic state. These figures indicate that the spread of extremist ideologies is not confined to the digital sphere but has also infiltrated educational institutions.[35]

Religious authority in established Islam, especially in rural communities, does not just label anyone with religious expertise. This is what is referred to as traditional religious authority. In this concept, traditional communities trust religious authority more to Ulama, who actually have

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[33] The Jakarta Post, "Religious Concervative Narative Dominatse Social Media Space in Indonesia," 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/11/16/religious-conservative-narrative-dominates-social-media-spaces-in-indonesia.html,.

[34] Ali Mursyid Azisi et al., "Resolution of the Main Values of Wasathiyah Islam as an Effort to Counter the Movement of Religious Radicalism," *Indonesian Journal of Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies*, February 19, 2024: 193-224, https://doi.org/10.20885/ijiis.vol6.iss2.art5.

[35] M Gazali, Syamsul Huda, and Edi Kurniawan, "Portraits and Excuses of Religious Radicalism in Educational Institutions," *Al-Hayat: Journal of Islamic Education* 8, no. 4 (2024): 1214–31, https://doi.org/10.35723/ajie.v8i4.473.

deep knowledge of the Qur'an and Hadith (foundation text) and classical Islamic traditions. For example, they have a background in religious education, such as Al-Azhar or Islamic boarding schools that deeply study Islamic sciences. With this background, they have the authority to issue religious fatwas. This term, Ulama in academic studies, is referred to as traditional religious authority.[36] Instead, the trend that is developing today is instant preachers who do not have a background in competent Islamic understanding and do not have a *sanad*. Armando Salvatore said that this group does not deserve to be the holder of religious authority in various spaces, especially in social media or cyber.[37] Meanwhile, Turner and Nasir said that religious authority in the midst of new media is a big challenge for ordinary people to be careful in taking sources from trusted people, have a qualified religious education background and are not influenced by radical understanding.[38]

In the standard of demanding knowledge in the excerpt from the *Ta'līm al-Muta'allim* by al-Zarnūjī, there are six main requirements: 1) *Dhakā'un* (intelligence): meaning that it is not necessary to have above-average skills or high IQ, but rather that everyone has their own learning potential and abilities, and this is the first provision; 2) *Ḥirṣun* (diligence): Perseverance is able to lead a student to achieve 'wise understanding, and vice versa; 3) *Iṣṭibārūn* (patience): patience is a fundamental aspect in demanding knowledge, because the trials are so diverse. Ranging from material, mental, spiritual, or physical pressure; 4) *Bulghatun* (cost): in the process of demanding knowledge, the existence of costs is a necessity to support the learning process; 5) *Irshād ustādzin* (teacher's instructions or guidance): meaning that as a knowledge seeker must be under the guidance of the teacher and not rush in responding to something rashly. The role of an

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[36] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "The Ulama and Contestations on Religious Authority," in *Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates* (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2009), pp. 206–36.

[37] Armando Salvatore, "Global Influences and Discontiuities in a Religious Tradition: Public Islam and the New Shari'a," in *Dissociation and Appropriation: Responses to Globalization in Asia and Africa*, vol. 10 (Boston: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2021), p. 7.

[38] Bryan S. Turner and Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir, "Religious Authority and the New Media," in *The Sociology of Islam* (London: Routledge - Taylor & Francis Groub, 2013), p. 18.

ʾālim and wise teacher is so important to maintain a connected scientific sanad; and 6) Ṭūl al-Zamān (with a long time), meaning that the requirement for demanding knowledge is not to be in a hurry. Knowledge cannot be obtained instantly, but over a long period, so that in practice, it is accompanied by sufficient understanding.[39]

In this context, the six conditions for seeking knowledge must be fulfilled. If one of the conditions is missed, it will hurt someone who is thirsty for religion. He will fall into the puddle of ignorance and obstinacy in interpreting the knowledge learned, including religion. In this context, the six conditions are less fulfilled by instant *ustadz*. This is due to the instant culture, which demands that a person wants to learn religion quickly and be in a hurry to issue a fatwa. The nature of Islam itself in the Qur'an is commanded not to be hasty in learning religion, as in QS. Ṭāhā verse 114:

فَتَعٰلَى اللّٰهُ الْمَلِكُ الْحَقُّ ۚ وَلَا تَعْجَلْ بِالْقُرْاٰنِ مِنْ قَبْلِ اَنْ يُّقْضٰىٓ اِلَيْكَ وَحْيُهٗ ۖ وَقُلْ رَّبِّ زِدْنِيْ عِلْمًا

Meaning: "So High is Allah, the true King. And do not hasten (to recite) the Qur'an before it has been revealed to you, and say, "My God, add to me knowledge.""

The explanation of the above verse in *Tafsīr Rūḥ al-Maʿānī*, that Allah SWT gave orders to the Prophet Muhammad Saw not to rush when he wanted to memorize the verse before the angel Gabriel finished reading (revelation). The verse was revealed in connection with the incident where the Prophet hastily wanted to memorize the verse revealed by the angel Gabriel immediately. The Prophet followed the angel Gabriel, who was reciting (every letter). Then Allah SWT ordered to ask for additional knowledge without the need to rush, so there was a prayer "*rabbī zidnī ʿilman*" (My God, add to me knowledge).[40]

Learning religion hastily and instantly without the guidance of a teacher with a clear *sanad* will have an impact on the superficiality of religious

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[39] Al-Zarnuji, *Taʿlīm al-Mutaʿallim*, I (Surabaya: Maktabah Syaikh Salam bin Nabhani, n.d.), pp. 2-3.

[40] Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Alūsī, *Rūh al-Maʿānī fi Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAīm wa al-Sabʿ al-Matsāni. Vol 13* (Beirut: Al-Resalah Publishing House, 2010), p. 348.

understanding. From the understanding of religious teachings (Islam) is only skin deep, not towards the substance, it will not be able to capture the main purpose of religion. The shallowness of understanding of religious messages can at least be seen from three characteristics, namely: 1) Understanding religious texts in a literalist and inconsequential; 2) Only understanding the skin of religious teachings; 3) Not mastering reading the Qur'an according to the correct rules.

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┌─────────────────┐              ┌─────────────────┐
│ Learning religion│             │    Shallow      │
│  instantaneously │  ──────▶    │ understanding of│
│  and without a   │             │    religion     │
│ clearly anchored │             │                 │
│     teacher      │             │                 │
└─────────────────┘              └─────────────────┘
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Scheme 1: The impact of instant learning and without a clearly anchored teacher

From the scheme above, we deliberately use the editorial "shallow understanding of religion" because unstructured learning patterns and without the guidance of the right teacher, cause a person to fall into a misunderstanding of understanding knowledge. Therefore, the rise of the hijrah phenomenon that is popular among artists and urban Muslims, which has an impact on the sudden phenomenon of suddenly becoming an *ustadz*, needs full attention. This is because the basic concepts in studying Islam must be in accordance with predetermined standard criteria in order to be able to understand and practice religious teachings properly. Therefore, instant preachers who do not have a qualified religious understanding of cyber media are currently a threat as well as a challenge to religion in the modern era. Salvatore said that in the modern era, Islam in the public sphere must be a common good, instead of religious authority in the public sphere (social media) being shifted by people who do not have a deep scientific background, in the sense that they tend to be radical or extreme.[41]

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[41] Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman, *Public Islam and the Common Good* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 87.

The Arrogance of Instant *Ustadz*

In addition to non-muslim cases, artists, band groups, or other former entertainment workers who are rumored to have hijrah or suddenly become preachers need to be questioned about the *sanad* of their knowledge. Like where did they study religion? Who did they study with? What is their motivation to become a preacher? And even under whose influence he dared to buy himself as an *ustadz*. The word "*ustadz*" is basically attributed to those who are experts in the field of religion. Even in history, in the past, not just anyone could be called an *ustadz* or Ulama.[42] In contrast to the traditional period, the modern era is characterized by the emergence of *ustadz* only because of their external appearance without looking at their capacity for understanding. In this context, many studies refer to the sudden migration of artists to become preachers as the commodification of religion.[43]

Learning instant religion also results in a rigid attitude in carrying out the da'wah process. The rigidity in question includes ideology, attitude, and behavior in everyday life. A characteristic that can be found easily is that they tend to be exclusive, even demonizing certain groups. As mentioned by Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, the characteristics of an extreme attitude in preaching are as follows: 1) Fanatic: that is, rejecting other views of Islam, even rejecting other madhabs or groups; 2) Obligating something that is attributed to God's command, or carrying the name of God to legalize a certain action. Allah SWT itself does not legalize it, for example, forbidding something that is not necessarily forbidden by religion; 3) Rigid in religion, for example, giving strict rules to someone who is a new convert; 4) Hard in preaching, even though the Prophet's command, when preaching must be with *bi al-hikmah* (wisdom & gentleness).[44]

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[42] Hei Wai Weng, "On-Offline Dakwah: Social Media and Islamic Preaching in Malaysia and Indonesia," in *Mediatized Religion in Asia*, 1 (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), pp. 1–16.

[43] Fitri and Jayanti, "Fenomena Seleb Hijrah." pp. 1-17.

[44] Muhamad Agus Mushodiq, "Konsep Dakwah Nir-Radikalisme Perspektif Syaikh Ali Mahfudz," *Wardah: Jurnal Dakwah dan Kemasyarakatan* 21, vol. 1 (2020): 66-105.

Other characteristics of preachers who fall into the extreme category besides the above are denying plurality in the midst of life, supremacy (feeling superior), and even rejecting local traditions as something *bid*.[45] These stages are things that need to be observed by various groups in identifying the characteristics of someone who is rigid; in this case, it can be called religious arrogance. Arrogance in religion is another diction of the words radical and extreme.[46] In general, to justify such religious patterns using the designation of radical, extreme, conservative, puritan, and even fundamental.[47]

In this paper, there is another term that can also be applied to actions that are similar to the above characteristics, namely arrogance. The word "arrogant" in the KBBI standard language means haughty, arrogant, arrogant, arrogant, or pushy. If it is interpreted in the practice or pattern of religion that is abusive, it is suitable to be called religious arrogance (arrogancy religiousity). This is in line with instant preachers who tend to be conservative, often easily stretching *halāl* and *harām*, easily disbelieving, idolizing, and even forcing people to follow what they want.

Religious arrogance is indeed a serious concern in the social-religious process. M. Toufikur Roziqin, an activist of Nahdlatul Ulama, said that a preacher who has an arrogant nature is not in accordance with the preaching of mercy taught by the Prophet. More fully, he stated that. "The Prophet taught da'wah and preached Islam lovingly and gently. If there is someone who preaches using violence and tends to be *takfīrī* and arrogant, this is a sign that it is contrary to the preaching of the Prophet Muhammad, Saw."[48] Then KH. Ali Maschan Moesa, as Deputy Rais Syuriyah PWNU East Java as well as Chairman of MUI East Java said, "Da'wah in accordance with Islam is *raḥmatan li al-'ālamīn*, not *maraḥtan li al-'ālamīn*". This indicates that preaching

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[45] Asif Mohiudin, "Islamism in the Digital Age: The Role of Cyberspace in Transforming Religious Authority," in *Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies* (Springer International Publishing, 2023), pp. 203-236.

[46] Emmanuel Sivan and Menacem Friedman, *Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East* (New York: State University of New York, 1990), p. 54.

[47] Nina Kasehage, *Religious Fundamentalism in The Age of Pandemic* (Rostock University Library, 2021), p. 278.

[48] M. Toufiqur Roziqin, Interview With Nahdlatul Ulama Activies, 2025.

with arrogance is something that is not in accordance with the teachings of Islam itself.[49]

Scheme 2: The after-effects of a shallow understanding of religion

Such a religious pattern is a social problem that can endanger the generation of Indonesian Muslims. The standardization of a person said to be hard in religion, which has been known as a radical term, is often a burden on the dynamics of religion in Indonesia. Arrogance can also be equated with fraud. As in the fraud theory proposed by Cressey in 1954, the cause of fraud is known as the fraud triangle theory. He stated that the causes of fraud have three aspects: rationalization, opportunity and pressure.[50] Then, Wolfe and Hermanson 2014 developed the theory, which later found the results of the fraud diamond. In his findings, he contributed to adding a fourth element to the causes of fraud, namely capability to the three elements mentioned in the triangle theory.[51] Then, the fraud diamond theory was developed again, most recently by Crowe Howarth (2011), known as Crowe's Pentagon Theory or fraud pentagon. In his research, he added a fifth element to the causes of fraud, namely arrogance. Another term for Howarth's theory is SCORE

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[49] Ali Maschan Moesa, Interview with Deputy Rais Syuriyah PWNU East Java, 2025.

[50] Donald Ray Cressey, *Other People's Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement* (Petterson Smith Series Criminology, Law Enforcement & Social Problems, Publication, 1953), p. 79.

[51] David T Wolfe and Dana R Hermanson, "The Fraud Diamond: Considering the Four Elements of Fraud," p. 66.

(Stimulus, Capability, Opportunity, Rationalization, and Ego). He calls ego as arrogance and motive in carrying out fraud.[52]

Furthermore, arrogance as a factor of fraud, according to Howard, is greed or superiority to the rights possessed. Another similar aspect is that he also feels that company policies and internal control have no effect on him, and he even thinks that his fraud is unknown to others because of the position he is occupying. Howarth continued that arrogance describes a behavior of superiority and lack of awareness due to greed, even having the mindset that the rules that have been set will not apply to him. If the research of Cressey, Wolve, Hermanson, and Howarth gave birth to a theory of the causes of fraud in the corporate context, in that case, it also happens in social-religious life, which is referred to as religious "cheating" or "corruption."[53]

Cheating is often attached to the characteristics of instant preachers whose capabilities are questionable. This is especially true for those who interpret religious texts haphazardly, even calling animals Ulama, making fun of the devil-hearted Banser and the harsh character of their da'wah (the case of *Gus Nur* or Sugik Nur), easily buying halal haram and even *takfīrī.*[54] Examples like this are said to be cheating in religion, which is easy to blame or interpret religion haphazardly, which leads to the denial of social plurality. In fact, Islam itself is a religion that recognizes differences (humans are created differently in order to know each other) (men and women are created in pairs), (there is no prohibition to embrace any religion / *lā ikrāha fī al-dīn*) as stated in the excerpts of the Qur'an.

Furthermore, the religious fraud in question is: First, as Crowe Howarth said as superiority behavior (feeling the most righteous) and lack of awareness (aware of the broad, flexible, and merciful teachings of Islam). Such is the result of greed with the mindset that the rules (religion) that have been established do not apply to him. Even worse is the existence of individual interests in it. The religious rules referred to here are the cheating they do by becoming instant religious teachers that do not apply to them,

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[52] Crowwie Howarth, "Putting The Fraud in Faraud: Why the Fraud Triangle Is No Longer Enough," 2011, https://www/crowe.com/global.

[53] Crowwie Howarth, "Putting The Fraud in Faraud: Why the Fraud Triangle Is No Longer Enough," 2011.

[54] Tim Penyusun Bimas Islam, *Moderasi Beragama Perspektif Bimas Islam*, pp. 85-86.

because their current position has been recognized as an *ustadz* in the life of the community. Second, religious cheating is not fulfilling the main requirements of studying, which, at least in the book by al-Zarnūjī, there are six components, "who learn without a teacher, then the teacher is Satan."[55]

This is what is ultimately referred to as religious arrogance or religious corruption with the following characteristics: 1) Adopting specific religious texts only for the benefit of certain individuals or groups; 2) Not accepting other people's opinions; 3) Hard in preaching, both in material and delivery; 4) Denying differences; 5) Tend to be exclusive.[56]

To avoid being arrogant in religion is to fulfill the standard criteria in learning as taught in the *Pesantren* tradition because systematic religious learning will have an impact on the ideal level of understanding. Learning a good religion will basically lead to a pattern of religion based on humanity (Foundation of Humanity).[57] Therefore, it is very important to understand the socio-religious phenomena that are spreading in the modern era. The phenomenon of religious arrogance is a further impact of understanding religion that is only skin deep. As the message from God in QS. Surah Luqmān verse 18, as follows:

$$\text{وَلَا تُصَعِّرْ خَدَّكَ لِلنَّاسِ وَلَا تَمْشِ فِي الْأَرْضِ مَرَحًاۗ اِنَّ اللهَ لَا}$$

$$\text{يُحِبُّ كُلَّ مُخْتَالٍ فَخُوْرٍ}$$

Meaning: "And do not turn your faces away from people (out of pride) and do not walk the earth arrogantly. Indeed, Allah does not like those who are arrogant and boast of themselves."

The main point of the verse in *Tafsīr al-Marāghī*, which is that people are prohibited from looking at others with a condescending look, and it contains the prohibition of turning their faces away from people as arrogant

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[55] Akbar Hutagalung Khairulman, "Challenges of Religious Moderation in The Context of Radicalism," *International Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary* 2, no. 3 (December 26, 2023): 840–53, https://doi.org/10.38035/ijam.v2i3.424.

[56] Gendron, "The Call to Jihad: Charismatic Preachers and the Internet." p. 1-20.

[57] Syamsul Ma'arif, "Education as a Foundation of Humanity: Learning from the Pedagogy of Pesantren in Indonesia," *Journal of Social Studies Education Research* 9, no. 2 (2018): 104–23.

people do. (Do not walk on the earth arrogantly), meaning do not let the intention of man walk it to be arrogant, as most people, either because it has advantages in religion or worldly. Allah says: "Do not be like those who go out of their hometowns arrogantly and want to be praised (*riyā*) (QS Al-Anfal 47). *Al-Mukhtāl* (arrogant) is likened to one who walks on the earth arrogantly. Likewise, *al-Fakhūr* (the one who boasts) is likened to the one who turns his face away.[58]

Problems of Religious Extremism

Continuing to sharpen the analysis in this paper related to the main mouth of the phenomenon of instant preachers in Indonesia is to pay attention to its social impact. The issue of "religious arrogance" is a characteristic that leads to a harsh and arrogant attitude toward religion. If such an attitude is given space to express more widely, it will spread to radical religious patterns to the extreme. Radicalism and extremism, while often interchangeable, have key differences. Radicalism is an ideology that encourages drastic, often violent, changes in the socio-political order. Extremism, on the other hand, is a distorted and exaggerated attitude or view of Islam, often leading to violent actions to impose those ideas. The character of radicalism is often synonymous with its goal of pushing for drastic changes in the socio-political order in the name of religion, using the threat of violence to achieve the goal of change, dissatisfaction with existing socio-political conditions, and fanaticism that is considered an absolute truth.[59] While extremism is more than that, its character is identical to excessive in taking a stand; its ideas deviate from the existing social structure, tend to impose their will on others to legalize violence, destroy social balance, and abuse the constitution.[60]

The further effect of the arrogant religious pattern of instant preachers (*ustadz*), which is more fatal is if it reaches the point of radicalism to religious extremism, including: 1) Preach the wrong interpretation; 2) Influencing ordinary people with hard *da'wah*; 3) Disbelieving people who do not share

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[58] Aḥmad b. Muṣṭafā b. Muḥammad al-Marāghī, *Tafsīr al- Marāghī.* Vol VI. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1974), p. 453.

[59] Stanley Rothman, *Roots of Radicalism* (Routledge, 2018), p. 80.

[60] Sumpter, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Priorities, Practice and the Role of Civil Society." pp. 112-147.

the same understanding; 4) Calling for acts of violence or fighting anyone on religious orders; 5) Corrupting the sacred texts of religion for individual interests by deceiving others. Of course, this trait is classified as the peak of religious fatality. It has a broader impact because it uses its authority recognized by the community as an *ustadz* in intensifying *da'wah*, which is contrary to the essence of religious teachings.[61]

Essentially, peaceful Islam is compassionate (*raḥmah*), does not legalize violence, recognizes social plurality, and has human values (humanity), which is then popularly known as religious moderation or *wasaṭiyyah* Islam. Therefore, this study seeks to make a theoretical contribution in defining the peak of fatality in understanding religion, igniting an arrogant attitude, to the attitude of religious extremism. If this editorial is adopted in the socio-religious realm, this action is identical to legalizing violence, fanatics, imposing their will on others, until those who disagree get the threat of attack.[62] So the conception or theoretical scheme that the author tries to build is as follows.

Scheme 3: Stages leading to a pattern of religious extremism

The elements of religious extremism are indeed slightly similar to the definition of radicalism and even religious conservatism. However, the differentiator in religious extremism here is the emphasis on the level of religious fatality. Fatal here is failing to understand Islam as a religion that upholds human values. As *Gus Dur* said, "It does not matter what religion or

[61] Kamali, *The Middle Path of Moderation in Islam: The Qur'anic Principle of Wasatiyyah.*, p. 109.

[62] Elmira Akhmetova and Muhammad Izzuddin Jaafar, "Religious Extremism and Radicalisation of Muslims in Malaysia:," *Journal of Nusantara Studies (JONUS)* 5, no. 1 (January 30, 2020): 104–23, https://doi.org/10.24200/jonus.vol5iss1pp104-123.

tribe you are, if you do something good for everyone, people never ask what your religion is; humanizing humans means glorifying the creator. Demeaning and defaming humans means demeaning and defaming His God".

Gus Dur, in his book, even rejects groups with extreme ideologies entering Indonesia, such as conservatives, radicals, and Puritans who legalize violence in the name of religion. When it comes to the point of committing violence and extreme measures, Gus Dur considers this to be unwilling to compromise. Gus Dur considers Indonesia a moderate country formed from local culture in carrying out diverse activities, and differences, according to him, are a necessity.[63] When referring to the sociological aspect, the function of religion, according to Thomas F. O'Dea has six components: 1) As the maturation of religion; 2) Correcting existing functions; 3) Reinforcement of embedded norms and values; 4) Traditional ceremonies and means of worship (a transcendental link); 5) Providing self-identity; 6) Reconciliation, solace and human support. Meanwhile, Hendropuspito divides the functions of religion into five: 1) Educational function, 2) Rescue function, 3) Social supervision function, 4) Fostering brotherhood function, and 5) Transformative function. Therefore, the main goal of religion is to create balance and protection for each adherent in the scope of social life. The Qur'an, especially in Surah Al-Maidah: 77, specifically mentions that excessive religion (ghuluw) is forbidden, as well as in this article known as religious extremism.

قُلْ يَٰٓأَهْلَ ٱلْكِتَٰبِ لَا تَغْلُوا۟ فِى دِينِكُمْ غَيْرَ ٱلْحَقِّ وَلَا تَتَّبِعُوٓا۟ أَهْوَآءَ قَوْمٍ قَدْ ضَلُّوا۟ مِن قَبْلُ وَأَضَلُّوا۟ كَثِيرًا وَضَلُّوا۟ عَن سَوَآءِ ٱلسَّبِيلِ

Meaning: Say: "O People of the Book, do not exaggerate in your religion in an unrighteous manner. And follow not the lusts of those who went astray before Muhammad, and they have led many astray from the straight path".

Wahbah al-Zuḥaylī in *Tafsīr al-Munīr* explains that this verse is a command of Allah SWT against His Prophets, including *ahl al-Kitāb* (Jews &

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[63] Abdurrahman Wahid, *Islamku, Islam Anda, Islam Kita* (Jakarta: Yayasan Abad Demokrasi, 2011), p. 158.

Christians). Allah SWT forbids exceeding limits in following the truth (religion) and forbids too much to glorify al-Uzair and Isa. Whereas in its contextualization on the law and fiqh of life, that verse is a warning from Allah SWT to *ahl al-Kitāb* (humans) so that they are obliged to stay on the straight path. The verse contains a prohibition on fanatics, blind taqlid inheritance and following passions. Zuḥaylī continued that people should not be deceived, deceived by the opinions of the views of the leaders of misguidance, the slander of people who are ambitious and have materialistic interests. The word "*lā taghlū*" means "do not exceed the limits", while the word "*ghuluww*" means: (rashness, carelessness, overreaching and exaggeration). This is followed by "*fī dīnikum ghayr al-ḥaqq*" (in your religion wrongly and incorrectly). In this context, "religious extremism," which is categorized as exceeding the limits, is strictly prohibited in the Qur'an.[64]

In general, global and regional academics in defining violence, rigidity, evil, cruelty, hatred, and evil in religion are more commonly referred to as radicalism. As a science that studies society, the formal object of sociology is identical to studying the social structure, social processes, social group life, social relations, and even social change. This discussion focuses on the social phenomenon of the presence of instant preachers who appear in religious clothes and are extreme in religion. Extremism in religion, if studied in sociology, then results are different from extreme in politics or companies (economics), as in the previous sub-chapter about the "arrogant" nature that Howarth found in the context of the company to be one of the elements of fraud. Therefore, in sociology, the fundamental question only revolves around "What is about the society that increases or decreases the likelihood of violence?" in the context of this study, the word "violence" is known as "extreme". Brutality or violence is said to be a social problem if "extreme or violence must also arouse widespread subjective concern".[65]

Crime, by Paul B. Horton said to be a natural condition of society (crime is a natural part of society). He said so because, in the social sphere, crime is found in various forms and layers of society. If viewed from the perspective of ideology, namely religion will inevitably be faced with a

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[64] Wahbah al-Zuḥaylī, *Al-Tafsīr al-Munīr fī al-Aqīdah wa al-Sharī'ah wa al-Manhaj.* Vol I (Damaskus: Dar al-Fikr, 1991), p. 331.

[65] James M. Henslin, *Social Problem* (Practice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1990), p. 40.

statement as a person's identity. Conversely, the ideology will have an impact on the pattern of religiousness.[66] From this ideological principle, a person establishes himself and believes that what he is doing is the right thing through religious texts. The impact is to cause fear and concern, even accusations against certain religions or beliefs that then disturb and threaten other ideologies, the existence of other religions, and the civilization of human life.

Therefore, brutality in religion is prohibited in the Qur'an. The *hijrah* community is a group of people who are most vulnerable to being carried away by the religious extremism patterns of instant *ustadz*. Besides, interpreting religion haphazardly without the guidance of the right and wise teacher will cause social problems. Islam basically has nine values of a balanced attitude in religion, namely: 1. *Rahāmutiyah* (compassion) given by Allah to His servants. *Rahāmutiyah* requires the flow and outpouring of affection without limitation, without discrimination, and without pause; 2. *Insāniyyah* (having human values), 3. *'Adliyyah* (being fair), 4. *Mubādalah* (equality or equality), 5. *Maslahah* (benefit), 6. *Mu'āhadah Waṭaniyyah* (maintaining the bonds of the nation), 7. *Dusturiyah* (obeying the rules that have been agreed upon, for example, the laws that apply in a country), 8. *Tathāmuhiyyah* (tolerance), 9. '*Urfiyyah* (not rejecting customs/traditions, even being able to make them a component of the source of law).[67]

Conclusion

Two major groups now represent the social face of Islam. The first group is the one that displays a civilized face, and the second group displays a religious extremism face. Currently, the phenomenon of extremism is gaining momentum, characterized by a fervent and widespread da'wah spirit, particularly in the context of leveraging social media to disseminate its religious ideology. Conversely, the rise in popularity of the extreme face automatically overshadows the moderate face. A dichotomy exists in this position, with two conflicting perspectives. Conversely, adherents of Islam are obligated to disseminate its tenets. Conversely, if the propagation is executed in an extreme manner that disrupts the fundamental tenets of

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[66] Martin L Sinaga, *Agama-Agama Memasuki Milenium Ketiga* (Jakarta: PT Grasindo, 2000), p. 89.

[67] Tim Penyusun Bimas Islam, *Moderasi Beragama Perspektif Bimas Islam.*, p. 69.

Islamic values, it will exert a deleterious effect on the religious practices of the community at large. This phenomenon has evolved into a significant societal challenge in the contemporary age, stemming from the perception that Islam is often associated with violence and aggression, rather than the concepts of mercy, politeness, and guidance that are often associated with other religions.

Consequently, in an effort to be aware of instant preachers who tend to be radicalized, there is a necessity for grand synergy and strategic steps from various parties. Firstly, from government agencies such as the Ministry of Religion, to continuously broadcast moderate Islam and provide standardization for certification to become preachers in the modern era. This is the initial provision to select radical-extreme and moderate preaching patterns. Furthermore, *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* (BNPT) and *Kementrian Komunikasi dan Digital* (Komdigi) are important ways to carry out strategic steps to be ready to block accounts, posts, and extreme propaganda in cyber media and to work to counter radicalism on an ongoing basis. Then ulama, academics, and the general public need to be involved in strengthening the literacy and understanding of religious authority holders who are good and correct according to their expertise in choosing fatwas campaigned on social media. Equally important are the efforts of moderate religious organizations such as the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah to always narrate moderate Islamic values through various contents to shift the dominance of radical-extreme-conservative lectures in cyberspace continuously.

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